In the majority of human societies parents control the mating decisions of their female offspring and choose spouses for them according to their own preferences. This parental choice determines the course of sexual selection, as men who lack desirable characteristics are excluded from reproduction. Parents prefer as sons-in-law men with traits such as industry and good working ability that enable them to be good in providing resources. However, many of these traits are unobserved, while future sons-in-law have the incentive to lie about their abilities. Consequently, parents have to solve the problem of selecting the most capable son-in-law between men who have the incentive to lie. One way to do so is for parents to impose a substantial cost to any prospective son-in-law. By doing so, parents can reliably test the abilities of potential sons-in-law. It is proposed that this cost takes the form of the two most common marriage institutions, namely bridewealth and brideservice, whose primary function is to enable parents to exercise their choice effectively. The determinants of these two institutions are further explored and evidence from the anthropological literature is provided.
Introduction
Until recently, researchers interested in sexual selection and human mating failed to take into consideration a characteristic which is unique in our species, namely, the control that parents exercise over the mating decisions of their offspring (e.g. Miller, 2000) . In most human cultures known to anthropologists parents do not allow sexual freedom to their offspring, and they control their mating choices by arranging their marriages with individuals of their own choice (Apostolou, 2007b; Broude & Greene, 1983; Frayser, 1985; Minturn et al., 1969; Whyte, 1978) . As pre-industrial societies resemble ancestral human societies (Lee & De Vore, 1968) , the commonness of this pattern of mating across the former is a strong indication that it was also typical of the latter. Apostolou (2007b) has recently proposed a model of sexual selection which accounts for this mating pattern. In this model, parental control over mating is the result of parents and offspring not having identical interests with respect to mating, and the former being able to impose their will on the latter. Furthermore, because the female is the scarce reproductive resource to which men seek access, parents direct their control predominantly over their female offspring. In this case then, as it is the parents and not the female offspring who exercise choice, male traits are selected on the basis of parental preferences rather than female preferences. That is men are differentially selected, and those who have traits that appeal to parents have a selective advantage over those who do not. In this model then, parental preferences affect the direction of sexual selection by determining who is going to be reproduced successfully (Apostolou, 2007b) , since individuals who lack favored characteristics become nobody's ancestors (Buss, 2003) .
In modern pre-industrial societies, and most likely in ancestral societies, human parents face a challenging problem: how to select between men those endowed with desirable qualities. This is a more difficult problem to solve than it first appears, as it involves the identification of traits in a mating candidate that are not directly observable. Selection is complicated further by the fact that men who do not share the desirable characteristics have a strong incentive to cheat so as not to be excluded from the mating market. Overall then, parents face the problem of identifying men with desirable but unobserved traits under strong incentives for cheating. The degree to which parents are able to solve this problem determines the strength of parental choice: if parents are unable to materialize their preferences into effective selection, this will weaken parental choice as a sexual selection force.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how parents solve the problem of selecting desirable men as spouses for their daughters.
Parental Preferences
In order to examine the way parents solve the problem of finding men who comply with their preferences, these preferences have to be identified first.
Borgerhoff Mulder (1988a) found that, among the pastoral Kipsigies in Kenya, parents prefer as sons-in-law individuals who enjoy high social status, are wealthy, educated, have a good character and are industrious. Apostolou (2007b) in a sample of 190 foraging societies found that parents prefer as sons-in-law men who are hard working and good providers, good hunters, and who come from a good family. Furthermore, Apostolou (2007a) asked a sample of British parents to rate a set of characteristics in an in-law. It was found that parents rank high in their set of preferences good character, industry, good financial prospects and earning capacity. In the most extensive study of parental preferences so far, Apostolou (submitted), using a sample of 67 pre-industrial societies, identified 13 qualities that parents desire in a son-in-law. Among the most frequently reported preferences are good character, good family background, good working ability, industry, favorable social status, good economic prospects and wealth.
Research on parental preferences so far indicates that parents consistently prefer as sons-in-law men with traits such as industry and working ability that are directly associated with a man's abilities to provide resources. Moreover, other desirable traits such as good character, good family background and favorable social status are indirectly associated with resource acquisition capacity: for instance good character is an indication that resources will be provided consistently over time, while men with higher social status usually control more resources (Buss, 2003) .
It is not surprising that parents place such great emphasis on the resource acquisition abilities of a prospective son-in-law, since such an individual will become an invaluable family member that will help the parents and their kin in their struggle for survival and reproduction. For example among the Seri in Central America, it is the husband's obligation to maintain his parents-in-law for as long as they live or for as long as the marriage lasts (Felger & Moser, 1985) . Among the Blackfoot foragers of North America families without an able hunter are likely to have to rely on charity for survival especially in periods of famine (Ewers, 1958) .
Finding a son-in-law who is good at providing resources is not an easy task for the parents. This is because traits associated with provision capacity like working ability, industry and good economic prospects are unobserved; that is, parents cannot tell whether a given man is, for example, industrious or a good worker, simply by looking at him. Asking a man about his abilities is unlikely to give reliable information, as lazy and incapable men are most likely going to lie about their abilities. Hence, the problem that parents have to solve becomes now more specific: how to distinguish between men those who have traits which are associated with the ability to provide resources, given that these traits are unobserved and that there are strong incentives for cheating. This paper proposes that parents solve this problem by imposing a substantial cost to their prospective sons-in-law. This cost takes the form of bridewealth and brideservice which are jointly the most common marriage transactions across human societies.
Marriage Transactions
In most human societies, marriage is associated with some form of transaction which involves the transfer of resources between the parties involved in the marriage. Out of the 826 societies listed in the Ethnographic Atlas resources are exchanged in 618 of them (Murdock, 1967) . Data taken from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), which includes 186 pre-industrial societies, indicate that bridewealth is the most common marriage transaction found in 38.2% of the societies considered, followed by brideservice in 12.9%, token bridewealth in 8.6%, gift exchange in 8.1%, female exchange in 4.8%, dowry in 4.8%, while no property is exchanged in 22.6% of the societies (Figure 1.) .
The analysis is focused on the institutions of bridewealth and brideservice which are the most common marriage transactions. It is proposed that the primary function of these institutions is to enable parents to select sons-in-law with good resource provision skills.
Bridewealth
Bridewealth is the transfer of substantial resources in the form of goods from the groom or his relatives to the family of the bride, and it is the most frequently found type of marriage transaction across cultures (Murdock, 1981; Schlegel & Eloul, 1988; Whyte, 1978) . In the Atlas of World Cultures bridewealth is reported in 226 societies (N=563) followed by brideservice in 63 cultures and reciprocal gift exchange in 43 cultures (Murdock, 1981) . Intense theorizing has produced a wide range of explanations for this institution with the compensation model to be the leading one. In this model, bridewealth is given to the family of the bride as a compensation for their loss of her labor, that is, bridewealth is a compensation for the right to remove the bride from her family (Murdock, 1949; Spiro, 1975) . Evidence in favor of this explanation is the observation that most of the societies where bridewealth is paid are patrilocal, with the bride moving away from her family after marriage and going to live with the family of her husband (Murdock, 1949) . Schlegel and Eloul (1988) questioned this explanation though, by arguing that most societies in which dowry is given are also patrilocal; so, if the compensation model was true, it would be as if the bride's family pays to have her removed.
Furthermore, bridewealth is seen as a guarantee that a woman will be treated well by her husband who risks of losing his investment if he abuses her (Murdock, 1949, p. 29) . Ogbu (1978) argues that the primary function of the bridewealth is the legitimization of the marriage: its payment elevates the man to the status of husband and the woman to the status of wife. For Mair (1971) bridewealth is a return made for the woman's fertility. Kressel (1977) views bridewealth as a symbol that reflects the social status of the parties involved in the marriage. Others take an economic approach and see bridewealth as payment for the services of women and the rights in her children with the economic conditions prevailing in each society determining its level (Goldschmidt, 1974; Schneider, 1979) . Bridewealth is also seen as an institution through which the ruling class, usually the elders, can perpetuate the social structure which endorses their dominance (Comaroff, 1980) . Last but not least, Ensminger and Knight (1997) see bridewealth as an effective mechanism employed by the older men, who control most of the wealth, so as to keep women in their hands.
All these explanations have grains of truth as it is unlikely that bridewealth has a monocausal explanation. However, all these theories so far fail to give a convincing account of why wealth moves from the bride to the groom rather the other way round. One reason is that most theorists attempting to explain bridewealth see this institution as a cultural phenomenon independent of the human nature. However, a different way to picture marriage transactions is as cultural epiphenomena associated with phenomena grounded in the interaction of individuals (Murdock, 1971, p. 19) who have a specific nature, a nature shaped by evolution.
One hypothesis for the existence of the institution of bridewealth which is consistent with this approach is that, the female is the scarce reproductive resource which parents are able to control. By controlling the mating of their female offspring parents can extract immediate resources from men in return for sexual access to their daughter. A similar argument can be made for the institution of brideservice with the difference being that this time parents extract resources from their son-in-law in the form of labor.
Although parents can receive immediate resources from their sons-in-law, bridewealth should not be seen as a wealth extraction device. Bridewealth is a lump sum amount of resources that especially in a foraging context, are unlikely to last for too long. Also, bridewealth is frequently accompanied by a return gift of equal value (Murdock, 1949) . For example, among the Tlingit of North America in return for the bridewealth, the parents of the bride give such valuable objects as a return gift to the parents of the groom that a marriage may be arranged solely to secure such treasures (De Laguna, 1990, p. 217) .
The argument developed here is that parents extract resources from their son-inlaw, because this allows them to test his abilities. That is, the primary function of bridewealth is to enable the parents of the bride to screen their future son-in-law.
Honest Signaling
The substantial reproductive advantages associated with access to the female give men the incentive to lie about their unobserved abilities. Thus, the problem that parents and sons-in-law have to solve is how to exchange reliable information under a strong incentive for cheating. A solution to the problem of reliably signaling unobserved properties under such incentives was proposed by Amotz Zahavi in his theory of honest signaling known as the 'handicap principle' (Zahavi, 1975 (Zahavi, , 1977 . Zahavi (1975) suggested that only a costly signal is invulnerable to cheating and thus reliable. Reliability is assured by the cost of the signal since cheaters are not able to fake it. The peacock's tail is the classic example of this logic. His long and heavy tail has no function to the peacock other than signaling to females. By building it, carrying it and still being alive the peacock signals his fitness. The tail is the test of fitness and only those who are fit can pass it. Less fit males cannot fake long tails because this would be detrimental to their survival (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997 ).
An important property of an honest signal is that it is logically related to the message it conveys (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) . For example, if a man wants to signal his strength he should engage in an activity that is physically demanding (e.g. weight lifting), rather than buying, let's say, a very expensive car which can be used instead as a signal of one's wealth. Thus, although the cost of signal is the primary property of an honest signal, this cost should be logically related to the message it conveys.
Zahavi's theory of honest signaling, despite initial rejection, has been widely accepted and is now considered to be the central framework in the study of animal communication (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005) . However, Zahavi proposed his theory as a general theory of signaling rather than a theory of biological signaling confined to mating signals in animals (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) . That is, in the case where cheating is possible and a property is unobserved, only a costly signal can reliably transmit information for this property. Such logic applies to the case of marriage transactions: the payment of bridewealth is used by parents as an honest signal of a son-in-law's unobserved abilities.
Putting the Son-in-law to the Test
By imposing a substantial material cost on a prospective son-in-law, parents can extract reliable information on a man's resource acquisition capacities. As the cost of bridewealth falls differently to men according to their ability, those with limited resource acquisition capacity find it difficult to concentrate the wealth required to pay it, but those with high resource acquisition capacity find it much easier to do so. This gives parents a substantial selection advantage. Just by being there, bridewealth deters those with limited abilities and effectively filters the capable from the incapable candidates. Overall then, by paying the bridewealth, the son-in-law reliably signals his abilities that make him a good provider; by forcing on the son-in-law a substantial material burden, parents extract reliable information from him. For instance, among the Hidatsa in North America: "The bride's household, expressing their social status by demanding horses or other property, tended to eliminate suitors who came from poor and low status households" (Bowers, 1965, p. 158) .
It is precisely its cost that gives bridewealth the utility of a screening tool at the hands of parents. However, an honest signal does not have to be costly if the interests of both the signaler and the signalee coincide (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003) ; but this is not the case here. Men are interested in mating with high quality women irrespectively of their own mating quality; however the interest of parents who control high quality daughters is to have them married to high quality men. As there is a conflict of interest between parents and prospective sons-in-law, the signal that will ensure reliable communication between the two has to be costly.
Bridewealth has the advantage of being flexible: even if the son in-law pays it and later for some reason parents become dissatisfied with the marriage, they can simply return it back to him dissolving their commitment to the marriage. For example, among the Gabrielino in North America, if parents are not satisfied with the behavior of their son-in-law, they return back to him the bridewealth and their daughter is free from the marriage (Bean & Smith, 1978, p. 545) .
Men receive substantial help from their family so as to be able to bear the burden of bridewealth. Data from the SCCS indicate that in 57.2% of the cases considered, the groom is to some degree dependent on his close kin for support in order to gather the wealth necessary to pay for the bridewealth (World Cultures, 2006) . Does this reduce the value of bridewealth as an honest signal of a man's ability to provide resources? Not really, because coming from a family which controls material wealth and being in good terms with them so as to be provided with resources, is an important aspect of the resource acquisition capacity of a son-in-law. To put it differently, if a man's family is wealthy and willing to divert some of this wealth to him in times of need, this increases his resource acquisition capacity: when in need he can always ask his parents for resources.
One implication of parental contribution to bridewealth is that this enables them to exercise control over the selection of their prospective daughter-in-law. Since men need the support of their families to collect the resources necessary for paying their bridewealth, if a son wishes to marry a woman that his parents do not approve, the latter may refuse to provide him with the necessary resources. However, if he wants to marry a woman who they consider desirable, they can provide him with the resources that he needs. Accordingly, by controlling some of the wealth necessary for the payment of the bridewealth, parents can, to some degree, influence their son's choice of a bride.
Determinants of Bridewealth
If bridewealth is such an efficient tool for choosing a proper son-in-law, why is it not universally found? The reason for this is that cultural phenomena such as marriage transactions are triggered in some populations more than in others, due to differing environmental conditions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) . So, the next step in this analysis is to identify the specific conditions that make bridewealth more likely to appear in a population. Two general predictions can be made: the existence of the institution of bridewealth in a given society depends firstly, on the existence of material wealth, and secondly, on the level of parental control over the mating decisions of the offspring.
To start with the first prediction, because of its material nature, bridewealth should be more strongly associated with societies where material wealth is important. Consider this unrealistic case: if there is no material wealth in a society, bridewealth, being of a material nature, cannot exist. Thus, the low level of asset accumulation among foragers may prevent the use of bridewealth in these societies. For example, when asked why they do not practice bridewealth, the Ainu hunters and gatherers of Japan, said that since they do not have any money, as the Japanese do, the groom pays for his bride with his own labor [brideservice] (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1974, p. 62) .
With respect to the second prediction, that is the level of parental control over the mating of offspring, if parents do not exercise such control, they cannot extract resources from their in-laws. In modern post-industrial societies, women marry late when they are independent from their parents both financially and physically. As a result, the latter are no longer in direct control of their mating decisions and they can only exercise indirect influence (Sussman, 1953) . Since parents do not control directly the mating of their daughters they can no longer demand material wealth from their sons-in-law, and consequently bridewealth is not found in these societies.
It can be hypothesized then that, across cultures bridewealth is more common in agrarian and animal herding societies, where both parental control and material wealth are important (Whyte, 1978) . Hunting and gathering societies, where parental control is substantial (Apostolou, 2007b) , but material wealth is limited, follow next. Finally, in industrial and post-industrial societies bridewealth is limited or non-existent since, despite the presence and importance of material wealth, parents have very little control over the marriage decisions of their offspring. Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that in modern post-industrial societies, like the USA or the UK, bridewealth is absent. Also, evidence from the SCCS (Figure 1) indicates that bridewealth is more common in agricultural and pastoral societies than among foraging societies.
When bridewealth is present in a given society, its level should be dependent upon a number of factors, the most obvious being the mating value of the female offspring. Parents with a daughter of high mating value can attract a man of equally high mating value. To ensure that they receive a high quality son-in-law they should demand accordingly a higher level of bridewealth. This is because the cost of the signal is correlated with the quality of the individual (Zahavi, 1977) : the higher the cost a man can bear the higher his quality. So, the level of bridewealth should be positively related to the mating value of a woman. For instance, among the Bear River Indians in North America, if a woman is industrious, modest and a virgin, she commands a higher bridewealth than a daughter who is widowed or divorced (Nomilamd, 1938, p. 100) . Borgerhoff Mulder (1988b) found that among the Kipsigi of Kenya lower bridewealth is paid for women who have already committed their parental investment by giving birth to children of other men. Similarly, among the Sebei of Uganda women who are divorced and have fewer reproductive years ahead of them receive a lower bridewealth in subsequent marriages (Goldschmidt, 1974) .
According to the honest signaling view, bridewealth is an instrument that parents employ to extract reliable information from a potential son-in-law. It follows then that its level should be related to the amount of information that parents already have for a given man. If parents have reliable information that a man is a good and industrious worker, bridewealth looses its value as an information extraction device, and its level is likely to decrease or parents may not insist much on its payment as it only becomes customary for them. Among the Shasta foragers in California: "If a man is known to be a good hunter and a good man, he is often gladly accepted by the girl's parents as a son-in-law, even if he is unable to pay in full at once. Under such conditions, he pays the remainder of the price later, as he is able" (Holt, 1946, p. 322) .
A proxy of the level of information parents have for a prospective son-in-law candidate is the distance of his residence from their own residence: the further away a man lives, the less information the parents have about him. On the other hand, for men who live close by, parents are likely to have more information and are able to know the best providers beforehand, thus they will tend to arrange marriages with these individuals. For instance, among the pastoral Kipsigi in Kenya, parents gather information about a son-in-law from friends, neighbors and acquaintances but such information is not available to them for men who live far away from their camp (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1990, p. 262) . Thus, for men who live close to the parents it is predicted that the level of bridewealth will be lower than for men who live far away. As a result, the level of the bridewealth increases as does the distance between the residence of the son-in-law to that of the bride's parents (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1988b) .
Also, in cases where parents have reliable information on undesirable properties of a son-in-law that are not associated with his resource acquisition capacity (e.g. being violent), they can directly reject him. However, this may turn out not to be an effective strategy as a direct rejection may disturb the social relation between him, his kin and the bride's parents and kin. Alternatively, parents may ask a bridewealth far above the mating value of their daughter so as to drive away undesirable candidates. For example, among the Sama Bajau in Philippines, if the parents are not interested in the marriage proposal they ask an unreasonably high bridewealth (Nimmo, 1972) .
Despite its efficiency, the practice of bridewealth is not always possible and in these instances parents impose a labor-cost to their son-in-law, the so-called brideservice.
Brideservice
In the institution of brideservice the groom has to work for a time period rendering the products of his labor to the family of the bride (Murdock, 1981) . As in the case of bridewealth, the leading explanation for the institution of brideservice is the compensation model. A husband's labor is seen as compensation to the bride's family for the right to remove her (Bossen, 1988; Murdock, 1949) . Brideservice is also seen as a system of protection for the young girl. A period of matrilocal residence through brideservice is a trial marriage under conditions of protection for the bride (Bossen, 1988, p. 131) . Collier (1988) also sees brideservice as an institution that establishes and maintains the husband's claims upon his wife. It is a demonstration of the man's willingness to defend his claim against other potential suitors.
Although brideservice can be seen as a bridewealth of labor (Schlegel & Eloul, 1988) , these two institutions differ in many ways. By paying the bridewealth, the groom signals his resource acquisition capacity to the parents of the bride. On the other hand, through brideservice the parents assess his abilities to generate resources directly.
More specifically, brideservice can last from a few months to several years when the groom works for his parents-in-law, hunting for them, working in the fields or performing a number of other tasks like cutting wood or carrying water. During this period of service parents can observe and assess directly the working abilities of the sonin-law. They can decide to terminate the marriage arrangement anytime they wish during this stage and they can send him away without any compensation. For example, the Yukaghir forager in Asia explicitly say that the period of service is intended only to test the groom's ability to work: "The Yukaghir themselves told me that the period of service is intended only to test the young man's ability to work. The bridegroom is required to be a good hunter and fisherman, and capable of doing everything necessary in a household" (Jochelson, 1926, p.87) . His services to the parents do not bind them and they may decide to terminate the engagement at any time, and the groom leaves without getting anything (Jochelson, 1926, p. 93) . Similarly, among the Saint Lawrence Island Inuit, brideservice lasts between two and three years, but if the parents of the bride are not pleased with the groom, for example if he is lazy, they could break off the engagement at any time (Hughes, 1960, p. 276) .
Throughout this period of brideservice it is usually the case that the groom is not given sexual access to his future bride. This right is only granted after the end of the period of service. For instance, among the Mikmac foragers in Canada, despite the fact that in many instances the period of brideservice exceeded the two years, sexual relations between the groom and the bride were strictly prohibited, and the groom had to wait until the end of his service period for the marriage to be consummated (Bock, 1978, p. 114) . If parents were to allow sexual access, this may have resulted into a pregnancy, which would have reduced the mating value of the bride and would have committed her investment to a given man. This would prevent parents from terminating the engagement, should they find that their son-in-law did not have the qualities they desire.
From the hypothesis that brideservice is an information extraction instrument it follows that, as in the case of bridewealth, the period of service should be dependent on the knowledge that parents have for a given man. If parents know from other sources that a man is, for example, industrious and hard working, the testing value of the brideservice diminishes and consequently the period of service is reduced substantially or it is even dropped altogether. For example, among the Agta foragers in the Philippines, if the parents know the groom to be a good provider and also know his family, they may dispense brideservice completely (Peterson, 1978, p. 52) . Yukaghir parents shorten the period of service if they know that the bridegroom possess very good qualities (Jochelson, 1926, p.87) .
Finally, parents can adjust the time period required so as to attract desirable men of known abilities. They can demand a short period of brideservice or no brideservice at all so as to make the marriage deal more attractive to a man that they would like as sonin-law. Among the Bella Coola foragers in Canada, parents find chiefs to be very desirable sons-in-law so they are willing to omit the period of brideservice (Mcllwraith, 1948, p. 403) . Among the Chukchee of Siberia, for rich men the time of service is much shorter or even dwindles to nothing (Bogoras, 1909, p. 586) .
Advantages and Limitations of Brideservice as a Selection Instrument
The institution of brideservice can be considered as a more advantageous screening device than bridewealth in the sense that it allows parents to assess better the qualities of their future son-in-law. Bridewealth, as any other honest signaling system, is generally reliable meaning that there is room for cheating (Jonhstone & Grafen, 1993) . On the other hand, in the case of brideservice there is little space for cheating to take place. In this institution the groom has to work for long years under the close eye of his in-laws and his abilities will eventually surface. Moreover, because parents come in close contact with their prospective son-in-law for a long period of time they can assess his personality and demeanor, which cannot be assessed through bridewealth.
However, there are a number of limitations to the brideservice as an instrument of parental choice that make it less preferable than bridewealth. To start with, a problem with the brideservice is that once it is executed it is difficult to rescind. That is, this institution is not as flexible as the bridewealth where parents, if they are not satisfied with the marriage, they can return the wealth they have received.
Also, the major problem with the brideservice is that it is time consuming. The usual period of service lasts between one to two years but in certain cases it can reach up to 10 years (e.g. among the G/wi in Africa; Barnard, 1992) and this renders it inefficient as a screening instrument. More specifically, the effective use of brideservice demands some prior knowledge of the groom before he is accepted to perform the service. Parents have to put effort and time employing other means in order to gather this required information for a number of potential candidates. Otherwise, if parents had to choose say between 10 possible candidates, and they demanded a year of brideservice from each one, it would take them a minimum of one year and a maximum of ten to decide. But among the ten candidates those who are not given the chance to start immediately (there is no case reported in the ethnography that the author is aware of in which more than one candidates perform brideservice simultaneously), that is the nine of them, most probably are not going to wait and will start looking for a bride elsewhere.
The time required for testing a son-in-law through brideservice is disadvantageous for parents. More specifically, the reproductive period of women is much shorter than the reproductive period of men, who do not experience menopause. It follows then that the mating value of the bride is inversely related to her age. Younger women are valued more because they have more reproductive years ahead of them. Additionally, women tend to become more independent of their parents as they grow older and they may start relationships of their own accord with men their parents do not approve (Apostolou, 2007b) . Time, therefore, is a luxury that parents cannot afford. Several unsuccessful periods of brideservice or even one can be particularly costly for parents. Brideservice is a risky strategy for them because if unsuccessful, they risk finding themselves with an older daughter who is less desirable and cannot attract high quality men.
On the whole, brideservice is a useful device for screening sons-in-law, nonetheless, it is inefficient in terms of time, thus, compared to bridewealth, is preferred less. Brideservice is not only found less frequently than bridewealth but when both institutions are simultaneously found in a given society, bridewealth is the preferred one. For instance, among certain North American tribes (e.g. the Shasta: Holt, 1946 or the Chilula: Wallace, 1978 ) the primary form of marriage transactions is the bridewealth but when the son-in-law cannot afford to pay it, he is given the chance to perform brideservice instead. This so called half-marriage is considered of much inferior status than the proper marriage where bridewealth is paid, while the groom who engages in it suffers a reduction in his social standing. Among the Nivkh, when the groom is very poor and the family of the bride lacks a man, the groom is allowed to perform brideservice in the place of bridewealth. He usually performs heavy and low status tasks and as a consequence brideservice is ranked very low in Nivkh values (Black, 1973, p. 78) .
Conclusion
By taking a cross-cultural perspective we see that parents control the mating decisions of their female offspring and arrange their marriages with men of their choice. Marriage arrangements are usually accompanied by the transfer of resources from the groom to the family of the bride. In this paper an attempt was made to explore the relationship between arranged marriage and marriage transactions. It was argued that the most commonly found marriage transactions namely, bridewealth and brideservice, work as selection instruments in the hands of the parents. Parents prefer to have as a son-in-law a man with traits such as industry and working ability that enable him to be good in providing resources. However, such traits are unobserved while at the same time men have a strong incentive to lie about their abilities.
Parents, so as to exercise their choice effectively, impose a substantial cost to their prospective sons-in-law in the form of bridewealth and brideservice. By doing so, they are able to extract reliable information about the resource acquisition capacity of a prospective son-in-law while men can reliably communicate their abilities to the parents. Bridewealth is a more efficient device as it is easy to enforce and rescind. In societies where less material wealth is produced parents rely more on brideservice to test the abilities of their prospective sons-in-law. In societies where both institutions are found bridewealth is preferred over brideservice.
It has to be said here that the arguments presented here do not constitute a general theory that attempts to explain marriage transaction as they do not account for all the marriage institutions found across cultures. Also, they are not a general theory of how parents select sons-in-law as there should also be other means to do so, especially in societies where arranged marriage is practiced but bridewealth and brideservice are not. It is however, a theory that explains the function of bridewealth and brideservice, and gives us a valuable insight on how parents exercise their choice.
Overall, parents constitute an important sexual selection force, the strength of which depends on their ability to select men who comply with their preferences. It has been demonstrated that although such selection is challenging, parents have means at their disposal that enable them to screen their in-laws for resource acquisition capacity. However, this is not the only characteristic that is desirable for parents. Future research should address the questions of how parents screen their in-laws for other traits such as good character and good family background. Finally, although to a smaller degree, parents exercise control over the mating decisions of their male offspring. Thus future research should address the question of how parents screen their daughters-in-law for desirable traits.
